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INTRODUCTION
Federal courts across the country have heard numerous lawsuits about the
legality of “sanctuary cities,” which limit cooperation with the federal
government’s immigration enforcement efforts.1 For example, a sanctuary city
might reject detainer requests issued by federal immigration officials or limit
the amount of information state or local officials provide to federal
immigration agents.
To curb this kind of noncooperation, several decades ago, Congress
enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (§ 1373), which makes it unlawful for state and local
government officials to “prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government
entity or official from sending [information] to, or receiving [it] from” federal
immigration officials.2 Although § 1373 was unsuccessfully challenged shortly
after its enactment, in recent years the statute has gained renewed attention
as the federal government attempted to enforce its terms by threatening to

1 See Major Developments Relating to “Sanctuary” Cities Under the Trump Administration, AM. C.L.
UNION, https://www.aclu.org/other/major-developments-relating-sanctuary-cities-under-trumpadministration [https://perma.cc/49SA-8UYK] (detailing a portion of the sanctuary city lawsuits
filed in federal courts). For the purposes of this Comment, I will primarily focus on state and local
governments outside the tribal context for two reasons. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1373 is directed at state and
local governments in particular, and second, the Tenth Amendment objection that I raise in this
Comment does not apply to Native Nations. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 383 (1896)
(distinguishing Native Nations from states as “distinct, independent political communities,
retaining their original natural rights,” which, in the Supreme Court’s view, limited the applicability
of the Constitution to Native Nations). It is important to note, however, that Native Nations are
currently being subjected to significant federal involvement on tribal land regarding immigration.
See Border Security and Immigration Enforcement on Tribal Lands, NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS
(2017), https://www.ncai.org/attachments/Resolution_MSMbAIAXAZXkvpaQLeKPtiNDhbFkTc
ERuyTyrrzhdmZnjXYtIxG_ECWS-17-002%20final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JPD-AC93] (describing
the unique harms that federal immigration enforcement has on tribal lands, including separating
members from the same Native Nation on either side of the Mexican-United States border and
forcing tribal law enforcement to incur significant expenses on behalf of the Department of
Homeland Security and other agencies).
2 See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (forbidding state or local legislatures from passing laws that restrict
information sharing).
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withdraw federal policing funding from noncompliant jurisdictions.3 Cities
and states have been remarkably successful in these recent lawsuits, as district
courts across the country have found the federal efforts to enforce § 1373 by
withdrawing federal grant funding to be unlawful under both administrative
law and constitutional grounds. And some district courts have found the
statute itself to be unconstitutional and in violation of the
anticommandeering rule, which prohibits the federal government from
instructing states and cities to enact federal policies.4
But, in early 2020, the Second Circuit stood alone in finding the federal
effort to enforce § 1373 to be lawful and the statute itself to be constitutional.5
By preserving the federal immigration law despite its seeming contravention
of the anticommandeering principle, the opinion created a circuit split that
advanced the anomalous view that federal immigration actions are exempt
from the otherwise generally applicable anticommandeering doctrine.6
The anticommandeering doctrine is based upon on the Tenth Amendment,
which provides: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States

3 See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (“[J]urisdictions that fail
to comply with applicable Federal law [will] not receive Federal funds . . . .”); see also U.S. DEP’T
OF JUST., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT: FY 2017 CERTIFICATION
OF COMPLIANCE WITH 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2018), https://www.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh241/
files/media/document/fy17jag_clo_1373cert_revaug10.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZM4E-C42F]
(conditioning federal funding on compliance with federal immigration regulations through a
certification of compliance).
4 See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855, 872 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (finding that § 1373
constitutes unconstitutional commandeering), aff ’d sub nom. City of Chicago v. Barr, 957 F.3d 855
(7th Cir. 2020); see also City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp 3d 289, 331 (E.D. Pa. 2018)
(holding that “Section 1373 violates the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution”), aff ’d in part, vacated
in part on other grounds sub nom. City of Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 916 F.3d 276 (3d Cir.
2019); City & County of San Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (ruling
that § 1373 “is unconstitutional”), aff ’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. City & County of San
Francisco v. Barr, 965 F.3d 753 (9th Cir. 2020); United States v. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1101
(E.D. Cal. 2018) (“The Court finds the constitutionality of Section 1373 highly suspect.”), aff ’d in
part, rev’d in part, 921 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2019).
5 Compare New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 111 (2d Cir.) (speaking directly to the
constitutional questions surrounding § 1373), reh’g denied 964 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2020), with City of
Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 282-83 (7th Cir. 2018) (finding that the constitutional question
was not before the court and deciding the “appeal turns on the more fundamental question of
whether the Attorney General possessed the authority to impose the conditions at all”), and City of
Los Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d 931, 934 (9th Cir. 2019) (resolving the sanctuary city litigation on
statutory authority grounds).
6 See generally City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272; City of Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen. of
the U.S., 916 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2019); City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2019). But
see New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d at 123 (holding that the Attorney General could
condition federal funding on compliance with federal immigration officials).
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respectively, or the people.”7 Honing in on the text of the Tenth Amendment,
the Second Circuit reasoned that “[a] commandeering challenge to a federal
statute depends on there being pertinent authority ‘reserved to the States.’”8 The
court surmised that the authority of state power “is not so obvious in the
immigration context.”9 This opinion echoed previous Supreme Court opinions
that have lauded federal power over immigration as broad, preeminent, and
exclusive.10 The Second Circuit thus concluded that the federal government may
permissibly commandeer in the immigration context.11 The Second Circuit’s
relied on a federally enumerated right within the Constitution—regulating
immigration—to justify federal commandeering and carve out an exception to the
anticommandeering rule based on a federally enumerated right in the Constitution.
The Second Circuit’s decision that the federal government can
commandeer state governments in areas of exclusive federal authority
through an enumerated right has profound implications. Not only would it
be the first time the anticommandeering rule has been given an exception,
but this precedent would allow the federal government free reign over state
and local resources, facilities, and even legislatures to further any federal
immigration agenda. The federal government could conscript entire state and
local police departments to act as fully-fledged federal immigration officials,
all financed with state funding.
Such a result directly undermines the concerns that animated the
anticommandeering rule. The constitutional prohibition on commandeering
was meant to divide power in order to avoid federal tyranny, maintain
political accountability, and prevent the federal government from shifting

7 See U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 183-84 (1992)
(holding that the federal government commandeering state governments into administering federal
regulatory schemes is “irreconcilable with the powers delegated to Congress by the Constitution
and hence with the Tenth Amendment’s reservation to the States of those powers not delegated to
the Federal Government.”).
8 New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d at 113.
9 Id.
10 This concept is known as the federal exclusivity principle, and the Supreme Court considers
this facet of immigration “well-settled.” See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394-95 (2012)
(“The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of
immigration and the status of aliens.”); see also Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (“Our cases have
long recognized the preeminent role of the Federal Government with respect to the regulation of
aliens within our borders.”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (“Our system of government
is such that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the people of
the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be
left entirely free from local interference.”).
11 See New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d at 113 (finding that a commandeering challenge
depends on there being reserved state power, which is not clear in the immigration context).
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costs onto states.12 If the Second Circuit’s approach stands, the federal
government would exercise unchecked authority in the area of immigration,
force states to be politically accountable for federal immigration regulations,
and shift the costs of a federal immigration program onto states.
This Comment will analyze the Second Circuit’s view that the
anticommandeering doctrine has an immigration exception. Part I provides
background on sanctuary cities, the anticommandeering doctrine, and the
federal government’s “exclusive” power over immigration. Then, in Part II, I
argue that, contrary to the Second Circuit’s holding, the anticommandeering
rule does not, and should not, have an exception for immigration related
commands. First, the anticommandeering rule has always been a doctrine of
general applicability. The Supreme Court has never created an exception nor
instituted any balancing test between federal and state interests.13 Second,
anticommandeering concerns apply in the immigration context as forcefully
as any other area of the law. The three primary concerns animating
anticommandeering—division of power, political accountability, and cost
shifting—all exist when the federal government commandeers state or local
resources in the immigration context. Third, even if powers committed
“exclusively” to the federal government, which the Second Circuit maintains
immigration to be, permitted federal commandeering, the reality of
immigration regulation belies the federal exclusivity principle. The federal
exclusivity principle has become boilerplate, contradicting the emerging
consensus that states and local governments consistently and frequently
regulate immigration.
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND ON SANCTUARY CITIES,
ANTICOMMANDEERING, AND THE FEDERAL EXCLUSIVITY PRINCIPLE
The sanctuary city debate is notable in that it has pitted one historically
recognized constitutional power against an emerging constitutional restraint:
the federal immigration power against the federal prohibition on
commandeering states. Generally, these two have lived in congruity. The federal
government regulated immigration, but did not commandeer the states to do so.
The passage of § 1373—and the Second Circuit’s preservation of it—have
threatened this balance, creating an artificial tension between these two

12 See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1477 (2018) (listing the three
justifications for the anticommandeering rule as dividing power to protect liberty, promoting
political accountability, and preventing one government from shifting costs onto another).
13 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932 (1997) (“[T]he whole object of the law [is] to
direct the functioning of the state executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of
dual sovereignty, such a ‘balancing’ analysis is inappropriate.”).
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constitutional principles. This Part provides a brief historical background on
these issues to contextualize the novelty of the Second Circuit’s decision.
A. Sanctuary Cities
The term “sanctuary cities” refers to either state or local governments that
have limited cooperation with the federal government on immigrationrelated programs.14 Sanctuary city policies can cover a range of issues,
including information sharing,15 investigations,16 and identification cards.17
In response to sanctuary policies, the United States Department of Justice
(DOJ) announced that the federal government would condition the Edward
Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program (Byrne JAG), a significant
source of federal funds for state and local policing, on compliance with three
new conditions intended to force cities and states to cooperate with federal
immigration officials.18 This Comment focuses on just one of the three
conditions, the so-called “compliance condition,” which requires recipients of
Byrne JAG funds to prove compliance with § 1373.
Section 1373 provides that “a Federal, State, or local government entity or
official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or
official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and

14 See Kristina Cooke & Ted Hesson, What are ‘Sanctuary’ Cities and Why is Trump Targeting
Them?, REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-crime/whatare-sanctuary-cities-and-why-is-trump-targeting-them-idUSKBN20J25R [https://perma.cc/LQG6DSEL] (stating that sanctuary jurisdictions are those that “limit cooperation with federal
immigration enforcement”).
15 See, e.g., Act of Oct. 5, 2017, ch. 495, 2017 Cal. Stat. 3733 (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE
§§ 7282-7282.5, 7284-7284.12 (West 2018)) (limiting the ability for federal immigration agents to use
information from state and local law enforcement databases).
16 See id. (forbidding California’s state and local law enforcement agencies from using state
funds or resources “to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest” suspected undocumented
immigrants in compliance with federal immigration requests).
17 See Sanctuary City Supportive Resources, CHI.: OFF. OF THE MAYOR, https://www.chicago.gov/
city/en/depts/mayor/supp_info/office-of-new-americans/sanctuary-city-supportive-resources.html
[https://perma.cc/Z5VJ-HQD9] (rolling out a valid, government-issued ID that does not convey
information about national origin or legal status).
18 See
Backgrounder
on
Grant
Requirements,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/984346/download [https://perma.cc/V7HY-GP8P]
(listing the three conditions to receive federal funding); see also Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen. U.S.,
Remarks on Sanctuary Jurisdictions (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorneygeneral-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-sanctuary-jurisdictions
[https://perma.cc/7PWQ-QPG2]
(requiring states to comply with the 8 U.S.C. § 1373 as a condition to receive the Edward JAG grant);
Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant(JAG) Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF
JUST. ASSISTANCE https://bja.ojp.gov/program/jag/overview [https://perma.cc/4Q9T-W6SF]
(explaining that the Byrne JAG grants are “the leading source of federal justice funding to state and
local jurisdictions”).
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Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration
status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.”19
Although the Supreme Court has spoken to what kinds of conditions
amount to unconstitutional coercion,20 conditioning federal funding on
complying with § 1373 is irrelevant to the statute’s constitutional analysis.
As one lower court put it,
[A]rgu[ing] that no anticommandeering claim exists here because compliance
with Section 1373 is merely a condition on grand funds which [a sanctuary
city] is free to refuse. . . . ignores that Section 1373 is an extant federal law
with which [a sanctuary city] must comply, completely irrespective of
whether or not the City accepts Byrne JAG funding.21

Thus, although the DOJ described § 1373 as a “compliance condition,” it
has always been a federal law that mandates compliance from state and city
government officials.
At the litigation stage, the federal government’s withholding of federal
funds from sanctuary cities resulted in significant losses in three circuit
courts. When ruling against the federal government, the Third, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits avoided the constitutionality of § 1373. Instead, these circuits
rested their decisions on administrative law grounds, finding the Attorney
General lacked the requisite statutory authority to withhold federal
funding.22 The Second Circuit, however, ruled in favor of the federal
government and explicitly ruled on the constitutionality of § 1373, finding
there was no anticommandeering violation.23 The Second Circuit’s decision
19 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a). The Immigration and Naturalization Service has since been disbanded
and reincorporated as the U.S. Citizenship and Immigrations Service, the U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Service, and the Customs and Border Protection Service, which are all part
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
20 Compare, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 537, 581 (2012) (finding
that creating conditions for funds approximating twenty percent of a state’s total budget was a “gun
to the head”), with South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 204, 210 (1987) (ruling that instituting
conditions on federal funding amounting to five percent of a state’s total budget was not coercive).
21 City of Chicago v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855, 867 (N.D. Ill. 2018), aff ’d sub nom City of
Chicago v. Barr, 957 F.3d 855 (7th Cir. 2020).
22 See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 282, 287 (7th Cir. 2018) (stating that the
constitutional question of using federal funds to conscript state and local law enforcement in federal
immigration schemes was not before the court and affirming the district court’s holding that “the
City established a likelihood of success on the merits of its contention that the Attorney General
lacked the authority to impose the notice and access conditions on receipt of the Byrne JAG grants”);
see also City of Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 916 F.3d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 2019) (“The City attacked
the government’s ability to impose the [c]hallenged [c]onditions on several statutory and
constitutional fronts. But we need only reach the threshold statutory question.”); City of Los
Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d 931, 934 (9th Cir. 2019) (deciding the issue on statutory authority grounds).
23 See New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 113 (2d Cir. 2020) (ruling the conclusion
that § 1373 violates the Constitution “does not follow”), reh’g denied 964 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2020).
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became the first significant win for the federal government in the sanctuary
city debate, but it also opened the door for federal commandeering within the
immigration context.
B. The Anticommandeering Rule
The anticommandeering doctrine only recently emerged after the federal
government, as the Supreme Court put it, “attempted in a few isolated
instances to extend its authority in unprecedented ways.”24 The
anticommandeering doctrine was not only justified on constitutional grounds,
stemming from the Tenth Amendment, but on structural and historical
grounds as well.
Under the Constitution, states have plenary power and the federal
government is limited to act only on their enumerated powers.25 Even when
the federal government acts within its enumerated powers, it cannot generally
mandate states’ compliance.26 The Supreme Court has stressed that “[t]his
separation of the two spheres is one of the Constitution’s structural
protections of liberty.”27 Under the Tenth Amendment, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly affirmed the principle that the federal government cannot
commandeer state legislative processes by directly compelling them to enact
and enforce federal laws.28
In addition to constitutional text, the Court also articulated three other
justifications for the anticommandeering doctrine.29 First, it provides a clear
division of power to reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either the
federal or state government.30 Second, it preserves political accountability by
Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476 (2018).
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 156 (1992) (citation omitted)(calling the federal
government “an instrument of limited and enumerated power” and finding “that what is not
conferred, is withheld, and belongs to the state authorities”).
26 See id. at 166 (“We have always understood that even where Congress has the authority
under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly
to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.”).
27 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997).
28 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 161. (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)) (“Congress may not simply ‘commandee[r] the
legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal
regulatory program.’” (alteration in original)); see also Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476 (finding that while
Congress has only certain enumerated powers, “all other legislative power is reserved for the States,
as the Tenth Amendment confirms. And conspicuously absent from the list of powers given to
Congress is the power to issue direct orders to the governments of the States”).
29 See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1477 (mentioning the three reasons as avoiding abuses of power,
maintaining political accountability, and preventing cost shifting from Congress to the states).
30 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 181-82 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
458 (1991)) (“[A] healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will
reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”); see also Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1477 (finding
24
25
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letting voters know which government deserves credit or blame for any
particular regulation.31 And third, it prevents the federal government from
shifting regulatory costs to the states.32
The Supreme Court provided a roadmap for what kind of federal statutes
constitute commandeering. In New York and Printz, the Court found that
federal mandates that affirmatively require states to enact federal laws
amounted to unconstitutional commandeering.33 The Court broadened this
rule in its recent decision in Murphy v. National Collegaite Athletic Ass’n by
holding that federal prohibitions on state actions could also amount to
unconstitutional commandeering.34 The Murphy decision resulted in multiple
courts finding that § 1373, a federal prohibition on state legislatures, was
unconstitutional commandeering.35
As a result of Murphy, the anticommandeering rule took center stage in the
Second Circuit’s analysis of § 1373. The Second Circuit found that § 1373 did not
amount to federal commandeering for two reasons. First, according to the court,
federal statutes do not implicate the anticommandeering rule in areas lacking
“pertinent authority ‘reserved to the States.’”36 The court focused specifically on
the immigration context to highlight the broad and preeminent power that the
federal government possessed in regulating immigration.37 This immigration
that the anticommandeering rule reduces “tyranny and abuse from either front” (quoting New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. at 181-82)).
31 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 168-69 (“[W]here the Federal Government
compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished.”); see
also Note, States Commandeered Convictions: Why States Should Get a Veto over Crime-Based Deportation,
132 HARV. L. REV. 2322, 2323 (2019) (describing how political accountability gets “eviscerated” when
the federal government engages in commandeering).
32 See Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1360-61 (2001)
(discussing how governments can shift costs onto others); see also Note, supra note 31, at 2339
(describing the federal government’s attempts to shift costs onto states in the immigration context).
33 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 176 (finding that forcing states to “take title” to
radioactive waste if they did not regulate it was an affirmative mandate to enact a federal regulatory
program); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (holding that a federal statute
that mandates state officials to participate in a federally regulatory scheme is unconstitutional).
34 See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478 (ruling that prohibitions, not just affirmative mandates, can
violate the anticommandeering rule).
35 See City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp 3d 289, 329 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (holding that
in light of Murphy, § 1373’s prohibitions on state and local officials “is fatal to [its] constitutionality
under the Tenth Amendment”), aff ’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. City of
Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 916 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2019); see also City & County of San
Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924, 945 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“Section 1373 is unconstitutional
considering the anti-commandeering principle and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Murphy
v. NCAA.”).
36 See New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 113 (2d Cir. 2020) (“A commandeering
challenge to a federal statute depends on their being pertinent authority ‘reserved to the States.’”),
reh’g denied 964 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2020).
37 See id. (using caselaw and statutes related to immigration to dismiss a commandeering
challenge to § 1373).
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supremacy—in the court’s mind—assuaged any anticommandeering concerns
over § 1373.38 Second, citing preemption cases, the court found that states cannot
pass laws contrary to the federal government, so a federal statute explicitly
preventing state and local legislatures from contradicting federal law did not
amount to anticommandeering.39
C. The Federal Immigration Power
The federal exclusivity principle asserts that the federal government has
sole authority over regulating immigration.40 The Supreme Court has
reiterated this principle time and again, attempting to ground it in the
Constitution and originalist arguments.41 The DOJ has, likewise, echoed this
idea that the government has exclusive authority to make and enforce
immigration laws.42
The federal government has interpreted this exclusive immigration power
broadly. More than regulating the inflow and outflow of immigrants, the federal
government regulates local employment contracts,43 police procedures,44 and instate tuition,45 all under the umbrella justification of “immigration.” But the
pertinent constitutional text falls short of establishing the federal government’s
exclusive authority over such broad issues. The most specific text on the topic
grants Congress the power only “[t]o establish an uniform Rule of

38 See id. (finding the commandeering concerns about § 1373 to fall short in an area such as
immigration where the federal government has “broad” and “preeminent” power).
39 See id. (“It is doubtful that States have reserved power to adopt—in the words of the district
court—immigration policies ‘contrary to those preferred by the federal government.’”).
40 See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“[The] [p]ower to regulate immigration is
unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”).
41 See Arizona v. United States 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John
Jay)) (“It is fundamental that foreign countries concerned about the status, safety, and security of their
nationals in the United States must be able to confer and communicate on this subject with one national
sovereign, not the 50 separate States.”); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941) (“One of the
most important and delicate of all international relationships . . . has to do with the protection of the just
rights of a country’s own nationals when those nationals are in another country.”).
42 See Katie Benner, Justice Dept. Sues Over Sanctuary Laws in California, N.J. and Seattle, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/10/us/politics/justice-department-sanctuary-law.html
[https://perma.cc/3HFC-WFP2] (describing how Attorney General William Barr claimed that the
Constitution gave the federal government the exclusive authority to regulate immigration).
43 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3)(A)-(B) (prohibiting any person from hiring “unauthorized aliens”).
44 See id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (requiring federal immigration agents to determine what crimes
constitute those of “moral turpitude”); see also Note, supra note 31, at 2337 (discussing how federal
penalties depend exclusively on state and local criminal actions).
45 See 8 U.S.C. § 1623 (forbidding state colleges and universities from providing in-state
tuition to illegal aliens).
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Naturalization . . . .”46 To get to the exclusivity principle, courts have
interpreted “[n]aturalization” broadly to include all immigration-related fields.47
This expansion of “naturalization” to support the federal exclusivity
principle in immigration has rested in large part on originalist arguments.48
The Supreme Court has held that “the supremacy of the national power in
the general field of foreign affairs, including power over immigration” is
reinforced by the Federalist Papers.49 Citing Federalist Paper 42 as support
for the federal exclusivity principle over immigration, the Court noted the
flaws associated with having fifty different paths to United States citizenship
instead of a singular federal path.50 But this justification and the
constitutional text still speaks only to the importance of naturalization to
become a United States citizen, not immigration broadly.
As a result of this tension, the federal exclusivity principle over
immigration has received criticism in recent years. Scholars have questioned
whether the Constitution grants the federal government such a broad power
over all immigration-related issues, arguing that such a conclusion is
inconsistent with current practices in which states regulate their borders and
engage in foreign affairs.51 In particular, scholars point out that the federal
exclusivity principle is belied by how states and local governments regulate
immigration at the local level.52 As courts continue to rely on the federal
exclusivity principle throughout sanctuary city litigation, this emerging
scholarly consensus has pushed against these decisions.
II. THE UNIQUE FLAWS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S PROPOSED
EXCEPTION TO THE ANTICOMMANDEERING RULE
In this Part, I argue that the Second Circuit’s exception to the
anticommandeering rule for immigration-related commandeering undermines
the core justifications for the anticommandeering rule. This Part is broken into
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394-95 (2012) (finding that the “Rule of Naturalization”
gave the federal government authority over immigration that is both “extensive and complex”).
48 See id. at 395 (citing the Federalist Papers to support the holding that the federal government
has supremacy over the area of immigration broadly).
49 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941).
50 See id. at 73 n.35 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison)) (finding that Madison’s
writings explained the importance of federal power over immigration).
51 See Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L.
REV. 567, 611 (2008) (“Nowhere in the Constitution is the federal government explicitly given exclusive
power over immigration.”); see also Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of DemiSovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 121, 161 (1995) (questioning the premise of federal exclusivity over foreign
affairs since “[s]tate officials now have routine dealings with foreign governments”).
52 See Rodríguez, supra note 51, at 611 (“Nowhere in the Constitution is the federal government
explicitly given exclusive power over immigration.”).
46
47
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two Sections. The first Section argues that the anticommandeering rule
continues to have broad applicability to all areas of the law, even if the federal
government claims exclusive authority in a particular area. The Supreme Court
has strongly rejected both balancing tests and categorical exemptions from the
anticommandeering rule. This Section will also analyze the most recent
Supreme Court anticommandeering case, Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, in which the Court broadened the kind of federal statutes that constitute
commandeering, and note how the Second Circuit’s preservation of § 1373
directly contradicts this recent precedent.
The next Section examines the immigration exception in particular and
explains why the Second Circuit’s holding is flawed. First, the Second
Circuit’s exception conflates preemption analysis into what should have been
a purely anticommandeering analysis. The Second Circuit ignored that § 1373
regulated state officials, not private actors. Second, an exception for
immigration negates the rationales for the anticommandeering rule. The
same justifications for forbidding anticommandeering—concerns over
division of power, political accountability, and cost-shifting—still exist in the
immigration context. Third, an exception for immigration intrudes on one of
the most core state powers: the state police power. By expanding discretion
to local law enforcement that states cannot revoke, § 1373 intrudes on the
duties of local police, an area traditionally preserved for state power. Fourth,
an exception based on the Second Circuit’s reasoning relies on a refuted
theory of the federal government’s role in immigration. The idea that the
federal government exclusively regulates immigration has been eroded not
just by scholars but also by courts and the federal government itself.
A. The Anticommandeering Rule is Applicable Across All Federal Enumerated
Powers
Any exception to the anticommandeering rule for federal actions based on
a specific enumerated power would be antithetical to the very foundation of
the doctrine.53 To date, courts have never recognized an exception based on a
federal enumerated power to the anticommandeering rule.54
53 The focus of this Comment is on exceptions for specific enumerated powers, as opposed to
exceptions for certain state institutions, as the Court recognized in Testa v. Katt, which required state
courts to enforce federal law because of the Supremacy Clause, or exceptions for certain functions,
as the Court left open in Printz v. United States for information sharing mandates. See Testa v. Katt,
330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (finding that the Supremacy Clause requires that state judiciaries enforce
federal law); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (declining to decide whether
information sharing mandates violate the anti-commandeering rule).
54 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (finding federal commandeering
unconstitutional even if the federal government has an enumerated power); see also City of Chicago
v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855, 872 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (finding “a mere policy rationale does not
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The anticommandeering rule is a rule of broad applicability: it admits no
balancing tests and no exceptions for federal actions made pursuant to a
particular enumerated power.55 The rationale is that either a balancing test or
an exception would permit the federal government to engage in
unconstitutional power grabs, even in areas where the federal government has
an enumerated power. In further demonstration of its commitment to the
anticommandeering rule, the Supreme Court has defined anticommandeering
not only to encompass affirmative federal mandates but also to include federal
prohibitions on state action.
The Second Circuit’s preservation of § 1373 disregards this precedent. By
prohibiting states from passing laws that limit cooperation with federal agencies
through § 1373, the federal government, as all courts except the Second Circuit
post-Murphy have ruled, clearly crossed the line into commandeering.56 But,
even after acknowledging Murphy’s applicability to § 1373, the Second Circuit
carved out an immigration exception in a doctrine that has been without an
exception based on an enumerated power since its inception.
This Section will critique in three parts the Second Circuit’s holding that
an enumerated power exception could exist within the anticommandeering
rule. First, I examine how Supreme Court precedent has rejected a balancing
test even in instances where the federal government has presented a
considerable federal interest. This rejection—even at times of national
crisis—suggests a strong commitment to the broad applicability of the
anticommandeering rule. Second, I discuss how the Supreme Court has
directly addressed whether an exception based on a constitutionally
enumerated right should exist and explicitly rejected this position. Finally, I
analyze how the Supreme Court has recently broadened the definition of
anticommandeering to include federal prohibitions on state actions—rather
than affirmative mandates—implicating § 1373, a federal statute that prohibits
state legislatures from passing certain laws, directly.
1. Rejecting a Balancing Test
A balancing approach to the anticommandeering doctrine would weigh
federal interests against state interests, but the Supreme Court has flatly
rejected such an approach. It held in New York that even “a particularly strong
federal interest” could not “enable Congress to command a state government
empower the Court to craft a constitutional exception heretofore unidentified in Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence.”), aff ’d sub nom. City of Chicago v. Barr, 957 F.3d 855 (7th Cir. 2020).
55 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 167 (rejecting the federal government’s argument
that it can commandeer states as justified under the federally enumerated power to regulate
interstate commerce).
56 See supra text accompanying note 4.
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to enact state regulation.”57 The Court emphasized, “Where a federal interest
is sufficiently strong to cause Congress to legislate, it must do so directly; it
may not conscript state governments as its agents.”58 This approach reinforces
the principle that once the federal government has crossed the line into
commandeering, the action becomes unconstitutional. The federal
government’s interest in a particular area—regulating nuclear waste,
handguns, or immigration—cannot justify the federal government’s action.
Even in times of national crisis, the federal government’s interest in
commandeering the states cannot overcome the anticommandeering rule.
When a novel virus known as COVID-19 forced the United States to reckon
with a global pandemic, it was state governors—not the President—who had
the power to lift stay-at-home orders.59 The Supreme Court has upheld state
authority to regulate high-stakes areas, such as the safety and health of its
residents, finding that these matters “do not ordinarily concern the National
Government. So far as they can be reached by any government, they depend,
primarily, upon such action as the State in its wisdom may take . . . .”60 This
yielding of power to states, regarding even the most consequential of issues,
precludes any balancing test and undermines any contention that an
enumerated right exception to the anticommandeering rule should exist. The
federal government may have an enumerated right to regulate an area, it may
even have a significantly high interest at stake, but it does not have a carte
blanche to commandeer.
2. Denying Any Exceptions Based on an Enumerated Right
In addition to rejecting a balancing test, the Supreme Court has also
rejected granting any particular area of law an exemption to the
anticommandeering rule. But the Second Circuit would make an exemption

57 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 178 (rejecting a balancing test even when the
federal law served an important interest). This view was later reaffirmed in Murphy. See Murphy v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletics Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476 (2018) (holding that “New York was clear and
emphatic” in its rejection of a balancing test as part of the anticommandeering rule).
58 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1477 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 178).
59 See Jonathan Turley, Trump Says It’s His Call to Reopen the Country. The Constitution Says
Otherwise, WASH. POST (Apr. 14, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
outlook/2020/04/14/coronavirus-federalism-trump-states/ [https://perma.cc/6FL6-LT7P] (describing how
the Tenth Amendment forbids the federal executive from encroaching on state executives, even in
times of crises). But see Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) TWITTER (Apr. 13, 2020, 10:53 AM)
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1249712404260421633 [https://perma.cc/42TMXMMH]
(arguing that “[i]t is the decision of the President” to lift stay-at-home orders).
60 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905).
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based on a constitutionally enumerated right.61 According to the Second
Circuit, the Constitution grants the federal government “broad” and
“preeminent” authority to regulate immigration; therefore, the Constitution
does not reserve power to the states in this area.62 If the states have no power,
then—according to the Second Circuit—the Tenth Amendment is not
implicated.63 When the Tenth Amendment is not implicated, the Second
Circuit’s logic continues, the anticommandeering rule becomes
inapplicable.64 Although the Supreme Court has found textual support for
the federal exclusivity principle in immigration,65 the notion that this gives
the federal government the authority to commandeer state legislatures
contradicts Supreme Court precedent.
Even explicit enumerated powers in the Constitution cannot justify
federal commandeering of state and local legislative decisions.66 The Supreme
Court spoke directly to this issue in New York. The federal government had
argued that when it regulates pursuant to the Commerce Clause it may
commandeer state governments to regulate nuclear waste.67 The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, stating, “where Congress has the authority
under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it
lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those
acts.” 68 As an example, the Supreme Court noted that the federal government
could “regulate interstate commerce directly,” but the Commerce Clause

61 See New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 113 (2d Cir. 2020) (finding that
commandeering challenges depend on states possessing some reserved power which does not exist
where the federal government has preeminent power), reh’g denied 964 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2020).
62 Id. at 113.
63 See id. (citing New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 343 F. Supp. 3d 213, 235 (2018)) (“It is doubtful
that States have reserved power to adopt . . . immigration policies ‘contrary to those preferred by the
federal government.’”).
64 See id. (“A commandeering challenge to a federal statute depends on there being pertinent
authority ‘reserved to the States.’”).
65 See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394-95 (2012) (finding that the federal government
has “broad, undoubted power over immigration” because of the “uniform Rule of Naturalization” clause
in the Constitution); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 73 n.35 (1941) (citing THE FEDERALIST
NO. 42 (James Madison)) (describing how early concerns over federal authority in immigration resulted
in the “uniform rule of naturalization” being added to the Constitution).
66 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (“[E]ven where Congress has the
authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power
directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.”); see also Josh Blackman, Improper
Commandeering, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 959, 971-72 (2019) (describing how Justice O’Connor
observed in New York that even if the federal government had an enumerated power, it was still
improper for federal power to commandeer state legislatures).
67 See Brief for the United States at 30-32, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (Nos. 91543, 91-558, 91-563) (arguing that the “take-title” provision is permissible commandeering since
Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause).
68 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 166.

256

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 241

“does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments’ regulation of
interstate commerce.”69
The Second Circuit’s opinion ignores this reality. By treating § 1373 as
constitutional, the Second Circuit misses the critical distinction that the
majority in New York highlighted. Section 1373 moves beyond regulating
immigration directly and seeks to regulate state governments’ regulation of
immigration. Even if the federal government has an enumerated right to
regulate immigration, regulating states’ handling of immigration is
unconstitutional commandeering.
The Supreme Court provided two avenues that the federal government
could employ to address an issue at the state level. First, using Congress’s
spending power, the federal government could attach conditions on the
receipt of federal funds.70 Second, the federal government could regulate
private actors directly.71 But in no scenario is the federal government allowed
to mandate state action based solely on its enumerated right.
3. Including Prohibitions in the Definition
The Supreme Court broadened the scope of anticommandeering rule to
include not just affirmative mandates but also prohibitions on state
legislatures.72 Holding that the distinction between affirmative mandates and
prohibitions was an “empty” one, the Court held in Murphy that “[i]t was a
matter of happenstance that the laws challenged in New York and Printz
commanded ‘affirmative’ action as opposed to imposing a prohibition.”73
Thus, a statute that prohibits state legislatures from passing a particular
type of law would seem squarely addressed by Murphy. Such statutes are
unconstitutional under the anticommandeering rule.74 Viewed in light of this
decision, § 1373—a statute prohibiting state legislatures from limiting
information sharing with federal immigration officers—should be

Id.
See id. at 167 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (“Congress may attach
conditions on the receipt of federal funds.”); see also Daniel J. Hemel, Federalism as a Safeguard of
Progressive Taxation, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2018) (discussing how states are endowed with
entitlements that the federal government can only conscript for a price).
71 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 167 (“[W]here Congress has the authority to
regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress’ power to offer
States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law preempted by federal regulation.”).
72 See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletics Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018) (finding that
anticommandeering applies to both instances in which the federal government mandates affirmative
action or prohibits state action).
73 Id.
74 See id. (ruling that the anticommandeering rule applies to both affirmative actions and prohibitions).
69
70
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unconstitutional. In fact, under Murphy every other court besides the Second
Circuit has come to that conclusion, finding § 1373 unconstitutional.75
When considering the same statute in 1999, the Second Circuit originally
held that § 1373 was constitutional because the court reasoned that federal
prohibitions on passing state laws did not amount to commandeering.76
According to the court, only affirmative mandates for states to enact or
administer laws could amount to commandeering.77 Since New York and Printz
only analyzed affirmative mandates, this narrow reading of the
anticommandeering rule could stand at the time. In Murphy, as discussed
above, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected this interpretation, finding that
prohibitions can also amount to commandeering.78
Ruling on its constitutionality again in light of Murphy, the Second
Circuit was still not persuaded that § 1373 amounted to an unconstitutional
act of commandeering. Although it acknowledged Murphy’s holding, the
Second Circuit still found that § 1373 was constitutional because it regulated
immigration, an area where the federal government has “broad” and
“preeminent” power.79 According to the Second Circuit, § 1373 could be
upheld—even if it acts as an explicit federal prohibition on state action—
because immigration sharing between federal and state officials is a crucial
feature of the immigration system.80 Thus, the Second Circuit’s reasoning
narrowed the Supreme Court anticommandeering precedent into a
convoluted assessment of federal interests, disregarding Murphy’s central
holding in the process.
B. The Proposed Exception for Immigration is Particularly Flawed
This Section makes four arguments against an exception to the
anticommandeering rule within the immigration context in particular. First, an
immigration exception cannot be justified under the Supremacy Clause since
See supra text accompanying note 5.
See City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that Congress
had not “affirmatively conscripted states, localities, or their employees into the federal government’s
service . . . . Rather, they prohibit state and local governmental entities or officials only from directly
restricting the voluntary exchange of immigration information . . . .”).
77 See id. (finding § 1373 constitutional because it was a prohibition and not an affirmative
conscription of states and localities).
78 See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478 (broadening the definition of anticommandeering to include
prohibitions).
79 See New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 113 (2d Cir. 2020) (citations omitted)
(holding the conclusion that states have reserved power is “not so obvious in the immigration context
where it is the federal government that holds ‘broad’ and ‘preeminent’ power”), reh’g denied 964 F.3d
150 (2d Cir. 2020).
80 See id. at 113-14 (citations omitted) (finding that “[c]onsultation between federal and state
officials is an important feature of the immigration system”).
75
76
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federal supremacy applies only in the preemption context, where private parties
are regulated, rather than in the anticommandeering context, where state actors
are regulated. Second, an immigration exception would undermine the
justifications for the anticommandeering rule by concentrating federal power in
one location, eradicating political accountability, and spending state resources
on federal enforcement. Third, an immigration exception would intrude on
states’ police power by giving the federal government supervisory authority over
state and local police. Finally, an immigration exception rests on a refuted theory
of federal exclusivity in immigration.
1. The Exception Conflates Preemption with Anticommandeering
The Supreme Court cautioned against conflating federal preemption with
anticommandeering.81 In Murphy, the Court held, “[t]he anticommandeering
doctrine does not apply when Congress evenhandedly regulates an activity in
which both States and private actors engage.”82 Elsewhere, the Court has
explained that the key distinction regarding Tenth Amendment federalism
principles is whether the federal government regulates private actors or state
officials.83 If a federal statute regulates private actors, courts should engage in
a preemption analysis. If federal statute regulates state officials, however, then
courts should engage in an anticommandeering analysis.
Without ever using the word “preemption,” the Second Circuit relied on
this preemption paradigm by arguing that states cannot adopt “immigration
policies ‘contrary to those preferred by the federal government.’”84 The
Second Circuit then cited Arizona v. United States, a case dedicated to federal
preemption, as support for the conclusion that a “State may not pursue
policies that undermine federal law.”85 As discussed above, this conclusion
would only be correct if the federal government implemented a statute
regulating private actors. States have little recourse when a federal law
regulates private actors. But the Supreme Court held in Murphy that “every
form of preemption is based on a federal law that regulates the conduct of
private actors, not the States.”86 Indeed, the federal government has passed

81 See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479 (finding that a preemption analysis requires the federal statute
to be regulating individuals, rather than states).
82 Id. at 1478.
83 See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 149-50 (2000) (finding that a federal statute does not
violate the Tenth Amendment if it regulates private parties rather than state actors).
84 New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d at 113.
85 Id. (citing Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 416 (2012)) (“[The] State may not pursue
policies that undermine federal law.”). See generally Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
86 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1481 (emphasis added).
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immigration laws that regulate private actors, and courts have rightfully
found state laws contrary to those to be preempted.87
In this case, however, the federal statute does not purport to regulate
private actors. Section 1373 regulates state and local legislatures by restraining
state and local representatives from passing certain forms of immigrationrelated bills and by dictating the actions of state and local law enforcement.88
The idea that states cannot implement laws “contrary” to the federal
government, as the Second Circuit held, carries no weight in a context where
the federal statute regulates state and local officials. Therefore, the notion
that preemption doctrine can play a role in commandeering cases is flawed.89
Admittedly, the court’s concern with a state program that obstructs the
federal government from enacting a federal regulatory scheme is valid. The
anticommandeering rule only prohibits the federal government from regulating
state and local legislatures and executive officials; it does not authorize states to
pass laws that deliberately obstruct the federal government. This is a legitimate
federal concern, and it is still an open question as to what kind of state actions
arise to the level of obstruction.90 Limiting information sharing in the
immigration context does not, however, obstruct any federal regulatory
scheme.91 The desired information originates from state diligence, exists for
purposes of state proceedings, and would be relayed by state actors, all of whom
are funded by state taxpayers. Of course, sharing this state-generated
immigration information would make the federal government’s job easier, but
convenience alone has never justified federal commandeering.92 As the Seventh
87 See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 400 (2012) (finding that a state law creating a
new criminal misdemeanor conduct already proscribed by federal law was preempted); see also Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, (1941) (“[W]here the federal government, in the exercise of its superior
authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation and has therein provided a
standard for the registration of aliens, states cannot . . . conflict or interfere with, curtail or
complement, the federal law . . . .”).
88 See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (“[A] Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not
prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration
status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.”).
89 The Second Circuit’s importation of preemption doctrines faces more obstacles given that § 1373
mandates how states should treat their own police force. The Second Circuit itself held that
“[t]raditionally, there has been a presumption against preemption with respect to areas where states have
historically exercised their police powers.” See N.Y. SMSA, Ltd. v. Clarkstown, 612 F.3d 97, 104 (2d. Cir.
2010); see also infra notes 142–153 and accompanying text for more discussion on state police power.
90 See United States’ Opposition to Defendant Joseph’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment at
15, United States v. Joseph, No. 19-10141-LTS, 2019 WL 6168476 (D. Mass. Oct. 18, 2019) (arguing
that the anticommandeering rule does not apply when state agents are “affirmatively, corruptly
impeding [a federal] immigration proceeding . . . .”).
91 See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 282 (7th Cir. 2018) (finding the restrictions
on information sharing did not arise to interference with the federal government).
92 See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855, 872 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (“[T]his Court has
found no controlling authority holding that such information sharing provisions are constitutionally
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Circuit noted, such a claim of obstruction is “a red herring” since “nothing in
this case involves any affirmative interference with federal law enforcement at all,
nor is there any interference whatsoever with federal immigration authorities.”93
Therefore, limiting information sharing is a far cry from state obstruction of
federal immigration laws.
2. The Exception Undermines the Rationales for the Anticommandeering
Rule
This subsection argues that an immigration exception would result in the
same harms the Supreme Court sought to avoid when it adopted the
anticommandeering rule in New York. These principles have continued to
animate anticommandeering cases. The anticommandeering rule relies on
three primary justifications for its existence in constitutional law.94 First,
there are concerns connected to the proper division of power in a federalist
system. If the federal government could commandeer states to enact or
administer any federal program, then its power would expand substantially.
Such a result runs contrary to a federalist structure, designed to divide power
between levels of government.95 Second, there are concerns connected to
maintaining political accountability. If the federal government could force
states to implement policies that are unpopular for their constituents, then
those constituents may punish the state officials at the ballot box. This
concern is especially true when regulating local immigrant communities,
whose impact is primarily felt at the local level. Third, there are concerns
regarding cost shifting between levels of government. If the federal
government could use state taxes to pay for federal regulatory programs, then
states would be drained of their monetary resources. This result could hinder
states’ abilities to provide their own state programs.
a. Division of Power
The division of power between levels of government is the essential feature
of federalism. An immigration exception to the anticommandeering rule
threatens to upend the proper balance. Underscoring the importance of the
impervious, and a mere policy rationale does not empower the Court to craft a constitutional
exception heretofore unidentified in Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.”), aff ’d sub nom. City of
Chicago v. Barr, 957 F.3d 855 (7th Cir. 2020).
93 City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d at 282.
94 See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1477 (2018) (describing the
three justifications for the anticommandeering rule as dividing power to protect liberty, promoting
political accountability, and preventing one government from shifting costs onto another).
95 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison) (“The powers delegated by the proposed
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State
governments are numerous and indefinite.”).
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anticommandeering rule, the Supreme Court in Printz held that “the
Constitution protects us from our own best intentions: It divides power among
sovereigns and among branches of government precisely so that we may resist
the temptation to concentrate power in one location . . . .”96 Allowing the federal
government to subvert the anticommandeering rule in the immigration context
blurs this division of power. This is especially troubling since federalism depends
on states serving as a check on federal power grabs.
Allowing an immigration exception to the anticommandeering rule guts
one of the few defenses that the Founding Fathers envisioned as part of the
states’ arsenal. James Madison wrote,
[A]mbitious encroachments of the federal government, on the authority of the
State governments, would not excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few
States only. They would be signals of general alarm. Every government would
espouse the common cause . . . . Plans of resistance would be concerted.97

In his theory of federalism, if the federal government encroached on state
governance, states could respond accordingly.
Sanctuary cities are just the kind of response to federal overreach that
Madison envisaged. First, the federal government asked state and local law
enforcement to serve as federal immigration officials.98 In response to that
encroachment, some state and local officials passed laws prohibiting
immigration-related information sharing.99 The federal government then
passed § 1373, conscripting state legislatures to federal will. According to
Madison, states should rebuke federal overreach. Under this Madisonian
vision, the actions states took to preserve sanctuary cities represent a properly
functioning federalist nation.
Section 1373 blurs this division of power by granting federal control over
state and local officials and, thus, conscripting state and local legislatures. The
Supreme Court has found both actions unconstitutional under the
anticommandeering rule. The statute directly discusses the actions of “any
government entity or official,” including state or local government officials.100
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison).
See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8800 (Jan. 25, 2017) (“It is the policy of the
executive branch to empower State and local law enforcement agencies across the country to perform
the functions of an immigration officer . . . .”).
99 See Act of Oct. 5, 2017, ch. 495, 2017 Cal. Stat. 3733 (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 72827282.5, 7284-7284.12 (West 2018)) (forbidding states officials from sharing immigration-related
information from state databases with federal immigration agents).
100 See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (“[A] Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not
prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration
status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.”).
96
97
98
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Essentially, it increases the freedom that state and local officials can exert
when working for a nonfederal government. This violates anticommandeering
principles, which would prohibit the federal government from deciding how
to allocate local officers’ time and resources.101
The federal government may argue that § 1373 never tells state or local
officials what to do, but merely allows local officials the discretion whether to
share information with the federal government. This additional discretion,
however, is a usurpation of power by its very nature because it gives state and
local officials discretionary privileges, outside of what their own government
may have given them. Strapped for cash, a state or local government may
decide to limit local law enforcement to just the immediate needs of the
community, but § 1373 would make this very choice illegal. Federal command
over state and local officials is exactly what the Supreme Court feared. In
Printz, the Supreme Court warned that the Tenth Amendment means nothing
if one could “say that the Federal Government cannot control the State, but
can control all of its officers.”102
Second, § 1373 conscripts state and local legislatures. The statute states
that any “State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or any
way restrict,” information sharing with federal immigration officials.103 In
Murphy, the majority observed that putting state legislatures under the direct
control of Congress “is as if federal officers were installed in state legislative
chambers and were armed with the authority to stop legislators from voting
on any offending proposals.”104 The Court warned, “A more direct affront to
state sovereignty is not easy to imagine.”105
Although the Second Circuit recognized that the rule in Murphy that
“prohibitions as well as mandates can manifest impermissible commandeering”
should apply to § 1373, it found the federal government could conscript state
legislatures because the provision inovled immigration.106 Not only did the
Second Circuit contravene all division of power concerns, but it did so by
essentially overruling recent Supreme Court precedent.
Through both the means, mandating what laws state legislatures can pass,
and the ends, control over state and local officers, § 1373 erodes state power
101 See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855, 869 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (“Section 1373
supplants local control of local officers; the statute precludes Chicago, and localities like it, from
limiting the amount of paid time its employees use to communicate with INS.”), aff ’d sub nom. City
of Chicago v. Barr, 957 F.3d 855 (7th Cir. 2020).
102 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 931 (1997) (emphasis added).
103 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a).
104 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018).
105 Id.
106 See New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 113 (2d Cir. 2020) (finding that immigration is
different in the anticommandeering context because it is not clear that states have any reserved power),
reh’g denied 964 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2020).
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and subverts core federalism principles. The statute demonstrates federal
commandeering at every level of a state hierarchy by conscripting state
legislatures and controlling the actions of those on the ground.
b. Political Accountability
An immigration exception to the anticommandeering rule would also
create political accountability issues. Officials of sanctuary cities and states
have explained that they want to be seen as welcoming and inclusive of
immigrants because doing so will better serve their entire community.107 To
those officials, the sanctuary city debate invigorates concerns over political
accountability. It provides an opportunity for progressive localities to enact
policies that counteract federal policies with which their constituents disagree
with. Philadelphia Mayor Jim Kenney stated that sanctuary cities “preven[t]
a White House run by a bully from bullying Philadelphia into changing its
policies.”108 Local sanctuary policies stem from a multitude of motivations
that constituents cite, from public safety to the local economy. Mandating
compliance with federal regulations thwarts these goals.
First, there are public safety rationales for limiting cooperation with the
federal government. Both the federal and state governments maintain that
their position is better for public safety. The federal government has argued
that sanctuary policies threaten public safety by allowing cities to shield
dangerous immigrants.109 By contrast, sanctuary cities and states have argued
that cooperating with federal immigration enforcement threatens public
safety by scaring away immigrant victims and rerouting law enforcement
107 See Sanctuary City Supportive Resources, supra note 17 (stating that Chicago’s mayor wanted his
constituents to know that Chicago will “continue to provide a home to hardworking, honest
individuals—regardless of their place of birth”); see also Jeff Gammage & Anya van Wagtendonk,
Judge Rules for Philadelphia in ‘Sanctuary City’ Case, PHILA. INQUIRER (June 6, 2018), https://www.
inquirer.com/philly/news/sanctuary-city-judge-rules-for-philadelphia-trump-undocumentedimmigrants-20180606.html [https://perma.cc/R97N-VDXV] (reporting that Philadelphia’s mayor
stated, “Philadelphia has always been and will always be a welcoming city,” and “Philadelphia needs
its immigrant community”).
108 Gammage & van Wagtendonk, supra note 107.
109 See Press Release, NYC Sanctuary Policies Continue to Shield Criminal Aliens, U.S.
Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.ice.gov/
news/releases/nyc-sanctuary-policies-continue-shield-criminal-aliens
[https://perma.cc/U5NMUU4H] (“When law enforcement agencies don’t honor ICE detainers, these individuals, who often
have significant criminal histories, are released onto the street, presenting a potential public safety
threat.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FISCAL YEAR 2019 at 4
(2019) (describing how illegal immigration threatens national security and public safety); Press
Release, Acting ICE Director Calls Out Jurisdictions With Sanctuary Policies for Threatening
Public Safety, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 26, 2019),
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/acting-ice-director-calls-out-jurisdictions-sanctuary-policiesthreatening-public [https://perma.cc/8X52-MHLR] (describing how the acting ICE director
accused sanctuary cities of threatening public safety by harboring violent immigrants).
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efforts elsewhere.110 While the federal government has pointed to isolated
instances of violent crimes committed by undocumented immigrants, state
and local governments have highlighted the chilling effect these laws would
have on witness cooperation and other citizen compliance.111 Before passing a
bill that limited the involvement of state and local law enforcement in federal
immigration enforcement, the California state legislature cited a study
finding that seventy percent of undocumented immigrants were less likely to
contact local law enforcement if they were the victims of a crime.112
Furthermore, many sanctuary policies make exceptions for those convicted of
violent crimes, allowing states and local law enforcement discretion to report
dangerous criminals to the federal government.113
Recent empirical evidence has corroborated the sanctuary cities’ position.
Researchers have found that crime in sanctuary cities is lower by a statistically
significant amount than crime in nonsanctuary cities when controlling for
population characteristics.114 Thus, state and local officials have been saying

110 See Sanctuary City Supportive Resources, supra note 17 (“FBI crime data . . . shows that
sanctuary policies increase public safety by allowing local law enforcement to focus on keeping
neighborhoods safe and encouraging immigrant communities to cooperate with [local] law
enforcement.”); see also Alyssa Garcia, Comment, Much Ado About Nothing?: Local Resistance and the
Significance of Sanctuary Laws, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 185, 206-07 (2018) (describing how
jurisdictions use sanctuary laws “to encourage victims and witnesses to come forward in reporting
crime and aid in investigations”); see also Tom K. Wong, The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and
the Economy, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Jan. 26, 2017, 1:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/immigration/reports/2017/01/26/297366/the-effects-of-sanctuary-policies-on-crime-and-theeconomy [https://perma.cc/G7BZ-UCSY] (describing how police organizations have concluded that
working with federal immigration officials “would result in increased crimes against immigrants and
in the broader community, create a class of silent victims and eliminate the potential for assistance
from immigrants in solving crimes or preventing future terroristic acts.”).
111 See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-173-005 (2018) (“The cooperation of the City’s immigrant
communities is essential to prevent and solve crimes and maintain public order, safety, and security
in the entire City.”); see also SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE NO. 121063 (Jan. 28, 2003) (describing
how immigrant communities are afraid to access benefits for fear of being reported to federal
immigration officers).
112 See Senate Bill 54: Hearing Before the Assemb. Comm. on Public Safety, 2017-2018 Leg. Sess. (Cal.
2017) (statement of Reginald Byron Jones-Sawyer, Sr., Chair on Public Safety) (citing a report by the
University of Illinois on the willingness of undocumented immigrants to contact local law enforcement).
113 See Act of Oct. 5, 2013, ch. 570, 2013 Cal. Stat. 4649 (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE § "#$#
(West #*+$)) (granting local law enforcement the discretion to cooperate with federal immigration
officers when a suspected undocumented immigrant has committed over thirty different violent
crimes); see also Act of Oct. 5, 2017, ch. 495, 2017 Cal. Stat. 3733 (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE
§§ 7282-7282.5, 7284-7284.12 (West 2018)) (giving local law enforcement the discretion to share
information with federal immigration officials when the suspected undocumented immigrant has
committed certain violent crimes).
114 See Wong, supra note 110 (finding crime—both violent and nonviolent types—to be
statistically significantly lower when compared to nonsanctuary cities); see also Gene Demby, Why
Sanctuary Cities are Safer, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/
codeswitch/2017/01/29/512002076/why-sanctuary-cities-are-safer [https://perma.cc/QT9K-JWKC]
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what the research has demonstrated: the more involvement local law
enforcement has with federal immigration agents, the more crime occurs,
despite the federal government’s insistence to the contrary.115
There are also economic considerations for fostering immigrant
communities. Research has demonstrated that immigrants contribute skills to
and help stimulate local economies.116 Immigrants benefit cities by serving as
both laborers and consumers.117 Some estimates have found that if the United
States deported all undocumented immigrants, the national gross domestic
product would decrease by almost eight trillion dollars by 2030.118 By contrast,
the federal government fears that low-income immigrants are a net drain on
the economy and have passed the controversial public charge rule to deny
visas to low-income immigrants.119
Regardless of whether benefits exist in passing sanctuary laws, prohibiting
state and local governments from choosing which policies to implement
prevents them from weighing such considerations. One commentator noted,
“Those communities that shun illegal immigrants will not receive the benefits,
if it turns out they exist. On the other hand, those who welcome illegal
immigrants will have to bear the costs or other negative consequences, if it turns

(highlighting a study that found that counties that complied with federal detainer requests
experienced 35.5 fewer crimes per 10,000 people than those that did).
115 See Wong, supra note 110 (finding that “the data suggest that when local law enforcement focuses
on keeping communities safe, rather than becoming entangled in federal immigration enforcement
efforts, communities are safer and community members stay more engaged in the local economy.”).
116 See GIOVANNI PERI, THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS IN RECESSION AND ECONOMIC
EXPANSION 6 (June 2010) (“Immigration can boost the supply of skills different from and
complementary to those of natives, increase the supply of low-cost services, contribute to
innovation, and create incentives for investment and efficiency gains.”); see also Wong, supra note 110
(“Median household income is statistically significantly higher in sanctuary counties compared to
nonsanctuary counties.”); Neeraj Kaushal, Cordelia W. Reimers & David M. Reimers, Immigrants
and the Economy, in THE NEW AMERICANS: A GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION SINCE 1965, at 176, 18081 (Mary C. Waters & Reed Ueda, eds., 2007) (finding that immigrants contribute more than their
population share to the United States gross domestic product).
117 See Kaushal et al., supra note 116 (observing that immigrants made up a fifth of all low-wage
work in the United States and that immigrants are a net taxpayer benefit when accounting for the
taxes and public services they use).
118 See Lena Groeger, The Immigration Effect: There’s a Way for President Trump to Boost the
Economy by Four Percent, But He Probably Won’t Like It., PROPUBLICA (July 19, 2017),
https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/gdp [https://perma.cc/PPH7-E2AW] (finding that if the
United States deported all unauthorized immigrants, the country would lose almost $8 trillion over
the next 14 years).
119 See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41292 (Aug. 14, 2019) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 103, 212, 213 ,214, 245, 248) (preventing immigrants from receiving a visa if
they are likely at any time to become a public charge of the United States).
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out there are any after all.”120 Mandating compliance with federal regulations
frustrates local officials’ ability to reap these benefits or incur these costs.
Federal encroachment, thus, undermines state and local political
accountability. Some communities may want their officials to pass sanctuary
policies to procure the benefits associated with increased immigration, but
federal mandates can impede these officials’ ability to enact those policies.
Unaware of the federal government’s role, voters could view their state and
local officials as bedfellows with federal immigration agencies, such as the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and could punish them at the
ballot box. This concern is particularly significant in the immigration area,
where many Americans seek to abolish ICE entirely, and national polls show
that Americans rank ICE as the least popular federal agency.121
Section 1373 in particular frustrates political accountability by prohibiting
state and local officials from directing their own officials. Through this
statute, the federal government asks line-level state employees to use their
own discretion to determine what to communicate to federal immigration
officials, rather than follow the guidance of local elected policymakers. In
Printz, the Supreme Court warned against this precise situation in which
states are “put in the position of taking the blame for [a federal program’s]
burdensomeness and for its defects.”122
Some Justices have disputed this claim, calling the notion that “voters will
be confused over who is to ‘blame’ [as] reflect[ing] a gross lack of confidence
in the electorate that is at war with the basic assumptions underlying any
democratic government.”123 But, voters may blame their state or local
governments for consequences not obviously linked to compliance with
federal immigration mandates, such as increased crime, a dearth of laborers,
or a sluggish economy.
120 Sharyl Attkisson, Sending Immigrants to Sanctuary Cities has Consequences—and That’s a Good
Thing, HILL (Apr. 15, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/438867-sending-immigrantsto-sanctuary-cities-has-consequences-and-thats-a-good [https://perma.cc/99MJ-SFE4].
121 See Establishing a Humane Immigration Enforcement System Act, H.R. 6361, 115th Cong.
(2017) (proposing a bill “[t]o establish a Commission tasked with establishing a humane immigration
enforcement system [and] terminat[ing] Immigration and Customs Enforcement”); see also Eric
Katz, Here’s What House Democrats Envision Happening After They Abolish ICE, GOV’T EXEC. (July
12, 2018), https://www.govexec.com/management/2018/07/heres-what-house-democrats-envisionhappening-after-they-abolish-ice/149676 [https://perma.cc/635L-XEZS] (discussing how the
“Abolish ICE” movement has increased in popularity).
122 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997).
123 See id. at 957 n.18 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]o the extent that a particular action
proves politically unpopular, we may be confident that elected officials charged with implementing
it will be quite clear to their constituents, where the source of the misfortune lies.”); see also Neil S.
Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1632
(2008) (“[I]t seems likely that citizens who pay attention to public affairs and who care to inquire
will be able to discern which level of government is responsible for a government regulation . . . .”).
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c. Cost Shifting
Moreover, an immigration exception to the anticommandeering rule
raises cost-shifting concerns. By requiring state and local officials to serve, in
effect, as federal immigration officials, the federal government shifts costs
onto state and local governments. Executive Order 13768, issued in 2017,
provides: “It is the policy of the executive branch to empower State and local
law enforcement agencies across the country to perform the functions of an
immigration officer . . . .”124 Although the Order uses the word “empower,”
the administration’s efforts to enforce § 1373 suggest instead that the federal
government would like to shift its financial and regulatory burden onto state
and local officials by having state and local law enforcement carry out federal
immigration laws.
In 2019, ICE spent $8.8 billion to administer federal immigration laws,
with the majority of its budget spent on enforcement and removal
operations.125 An immigration exception would allow the federal government
to offset these costs by requiring compliance through state and local officials.
Even some local residents that may otherwise favor increased immigration
enforcement have expressed fear that federal mandates requiring states to
administer federal immigration would burden local taxpayers.126
A core principle of federalism is the notion that the Tenth Amendment
reserves powers to the states that Congress cannot simply take, but must
purchase.127 One commentator noted, “The anti-commandeering doctrine
does not necessarily mean that states will stop administering federal
programs . . . . These doctrines do mean, though, that the states need not
relinquish these entitlements unless they get paid.”128 Thus, the federal
government can incentivize compliance, but it cannot mandate it through a
federal law such as § 1373.
3. The Exception Ignores State’s Inherent Police Powers
Stripping state legislatures of their ability to outline specific state officials’
duties has another important consequence. This policy results in the federal
Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8800 (Jan. 25, 2017) (emphasis added).
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 109 (spending over $5.1 billion on
enforcing immigration laws and removal undocumented immigrants).
126 See Chris Joseph, Alabama State Senator Files Bill That Would Criminalize Sanctuary City Policies,
WAFF 48, https://www.waff.com/2020/03/10/decatur-state-senator-filed-bill-that-would-criminalizesanctuary-city-policies/ (Mar. 10, 2020, 5:56 AM) [https://perma.cc/Z36B-3HXX] (describing how a bill
mandating local compliance with federal immigration laws “would put more pressure on city taxpayers”).
127 See Daniel Hemel, supra note 70, at 6-7 (“When members of Congress believe that the benefits
of having the states enact or administer a particular program are greater than the costs to the states of
enacting or administering the program, Congress can purchase the states’ entitlement for a price.”).
128 Id. at 8.
124
125
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conscription of an inherent state power: state police power.129 As Justice
Clarence Thomas emphasized, the Supreme Court has always rejected
constitutional interpretations of federal power “that would permit Congress
to exercise a police power . . . .”130 In fact, the Supreme Court has held that
any assertion disputing state police power “is belied by the entire structure of
the Constitution” and undermines an inherent part of American federalism
that “is deeply ingrained in our constitutional history.”131
An immigration exception to the anticommandeering rule constrains
states’ ability to assert their police power. For example, § 1373 gives
supervisory authority to the federal government over state police power by
prohibiting how states choose to allocate state officers’ time and resources.
When deciding how to allocate state official’s time, states had passed
information sharing restrictions that prevented state or local police from
sharing information with the federal government.132 As noted above, states
did so largely out of public safety concerns by highlighting how cooperation
with federal immigration officials prevented victims and witnesses of crimes
from coming forward.133 This decision reflected the policy choice to address
crime rates by increasing community trust in local police. Federal mandates
that supervise states and prevent them from addressing their public safety
concerns threaten state police power.
The Second Circuit’s contention that anticommandeering concerns are
inapplicable absent a reserved state power is turned on its head when
examining the implications such a policy has on state police power. Policy
decisions about immigration do not occur in a vacuum. Requiring state and
local police to comply with federal mandates rather than adhering to state
objectives intrudes on a core power that states possess.
Even cases that have heralded federal exclusivity in immigration have
drawn the line at encroachments on state police power. In DeCanas v. Bica,
the Supreme Court held that the federal government has exclusive power over
immigration but cautioned the federal government from passing statutes that
129 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1905) (finding that states did not
surrender their police power when joining the United States or when ratifying the Constitution).
130 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[W]e always
have rejected readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal power that would permit
Congress to exercise a police power; our cases are quite clear that there are real limits to federal power.”).
131 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 n.8 (2000).
132 See Act of Oct. 5, 2017, ch. 495, 2017 Cal. Stat. 3733 (codified at CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 72827282.5, 7284-7284.12 (West 2018)) (limiting information sharing between local police with federal
immigration officials).
133 See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-173-005 (2018) (“The cooperation of the City’s immigrant
communities is essential to prevent and solve crimes and maintain public order, safety, and security
in the entire City.”); see also SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE NO. 121063 (Jan. 28, 2003) (describing
how immigrant communities are afraid to access benefits for fear of being reported to federal
immigration officers).
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intrude on a state police power.134 In addition, the Court in Arizona v. United
States maintained that three state policies that supplemented the federal
government’s immigration regulations were invalid but preserved one state
policy that pertained to state police authority.135 The policy was a state statute
that mandated information-sharing between state and local law enforcement
and ICE to determine a detained person’s citizenship status.136 The Court
upheld a state’s discretion to dictate how their own police force interacts with
federal agencies, even if the law means the police force will ignore “federal
enforcement priorities” when reporting to ICE.137 In this instance, a federal
statute that ultimately outlines what state and local police can do has passed
this threshold and inappropriately infringes on state police power.
Furthermore, when rationalizing its attack on sanctuary cities, the federal
government has repeatedly cited public safety concerns. ICE has stated,
“When law enforcement agencies don’t honor ICE detainers, these
individuals, who often have significant criminal histories, are released onto
the street, presenting a potential public safety threat.”138 Even if these public
safety concerns were meritorious, the authority to regulate public safety
remains squarely within the state police power. The Supreme Court has held
that a state police power encompasses public safety and “do[es] not ordinarily
concern the national government”139 The Court has elsewhere emphasized
that this police power “has never been surrendered by the states . . . .”140
When regulating immigration at the local level, the line between immigration
and police power blurs. Federal commandeering in immigration not only
forces state officials to act as federal immigration agents, but also forces
134 See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356-57 (1976) (finding that “[s]tates possess broad
authority under their police powers” despite previously ruling that the federal government has
exclusive power over immigration).
135 See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 411-15 (2012) (granting state legislatures the
power to mandate that police contact ICE when they have reasonable suspicion that someone is an
undocumented immigrant).
136 See id. at 411 (describing how the Arizona statute requires state officers to try to determine
the immigration status of anyone they “stop, detain, or arrest”).
137 See id. at 412-14 (acknowledging the state law could lead to frivolous police stops but
preserving it despite these limitations).
138 Press Release, NYC Sanctuary Policies Continue to Shield Criminal Aliens, U.S. Immigr.
& Customs Enf ’t, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.ice.gov/news/
releases/nyc-sanctuary-policies-continue-shield-criminal-aliens [https://perma.cc/U5NM-UU4H].
139 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25, 28 (1905) (finding that the state police power
encompasses public health and public safety); see also Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Ry. Co. v.
Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906) (“We hold that the police power of a state embraces regulations
designed to promote the public convenience or the general prosperity, as well as regulations designed
to promote the public health, the public morals, or the public safety.”).
140 See New Orleans Gas-Light Co. v. La. Light & Heat Producing & Mfg. Co., 115 U.S. 650,
661 (1885) (“[T]here is a power, sometimes called the police power, which has never been surrendered
by the states . . . .”).
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federal officials to act as state and local law enforcement by expanding federal
power into the policing of local neighborhoods and communities.
4. The Exception Rests on a Refuted Theory of Federal Exclusivity
This final subsection describes state power in the immigration context and
argues that the sanctuary city debate fails to conform to the federal exclusivity
principle. Even if some exclusively federal enumerated power could merit
exemption from the anticommandeering rule, the on-the-ground reality
demonstrates that immigration regulation is not exclusively federal. Although
the emerging consensus amongst scholars refutes the federal exclusivity
principle, courts continue to cite it.141 The Supreme Court frequently asserts
that the “[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a
federal power.”142 The reality, however, is that the federal government would
not have a functional immigration regulatory system without support from
state or local governments. This landscape renders the federal government’s
claim of exclusive authority inaccurate. Despite the Supreme Court’s
boilerplate assertions of exclusivity, many courts, including the Supreme
Court itself, have held that states have the ability to pass certain immigration
regulations.143 In addition, scholars have demonstrated that state and local
governments continue to be heavily involved in regulating immigration.144
The federal government has even invited states and local governments to
regulate immigration.145
When confronted with the on-the-ground reality of immigration, the
federal exclusivity principle is a legal fiction. With increasing frequency,
scholars have criticized the federal exclusivity principle as boilerplate.146
141 See Rodríguez, supra note 51 (arguing that the Constitution does not actually grant the
federal government exclusive authority over immigration); see also Peter J. Spiro, The States and
Immigration Law in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 121, 161 (1995) (questioning the
basis for federal exclusivity in foreign affairs when state and local governments have in recent
decades taken a more active role in international and immigration law).
142 DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976); see Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395
(2012) (finding that the federal government power over immigration is well-settled).
143 See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 413-15 (2012) (upholding a state law that allows
state officers to ascertain the immigration status of an individual); see also New York v. U.S. Dep’t
of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 113 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that immigration leaves little reserved power for
states but then later finding that states could still enact laws pertaining to immigration), reh’g denied
964 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2020).
144 See Rodríguez, supra note 51, at 582-609 (describing examples of local regulation through
both restriction and integration-oriented policies including harsher penalties like criminal and civil
penalties but also benefit programs like day-labor centers).
145 See 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) (allowing states to include any undocumented immigrants into a
state or local benefit program).
146 See Rodríguez, supra note 51, at 576 (“The federal exclusivity principle, in all of its legal and
rhetorical permutations, does not map well onto reality on the ground.”).
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Federalism scholar Cristina Rodríguez has argued that the federal exclusivity
principle operates as an “exclusivity lie.”147 She notes that cities and states
have continued to regulate immigration by integrating immigrants into daily
life.148 According to Rodríguez, if courts fully enforced the federal exclusivity
principle, they would have to annul a significant number of immigration
regulations that stem from state and local governments.149
Sometimes courts even cite the federal exclusivity principle within the
very cases that uphold the authority of state and local governments to pass
immigration-related regulations. In Decanas v. Bica, the Supreme Court held
that federal exclusivity in immigration was unquestionable, but in the same
opinion, the majority held that Congress must clearly state its intention “to
preclude even harmonious state regulation touching on aliens . . . or illegal
aliens . . . .”150 Absent such a showing, the Court conceded that states may
possess the power to pass laws that do not conflict with federal regulations
and even gave state courts the power to evaluate these state regulations.151 In
Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court additionally preserved a state
policy that required state and local police to make a reasonable attempt to
discern someone’s immigration status.152 Arizona is frequently cited as
supporting the federal exclusivity principle, but in reality the Court’s opinion
granted concessions to states to regulate within the area of immigration.
The Second Circuit’s opinion perpetuates this inconsistency. At one point
it cites Arizona v. United States, a case that adheres to the federal exclusivity
principle, to support its claim that the federal government has broad and
preeminent power to regulate immigration.153 The Second Circuit later
pivots, however, stating, “This does not mean that States can never enact any
laws pertaining to aliens.”154 The court ultimately concedes that states can
pass laws pertaining to immigration, so long as they do not conflict with

Id. at 574-80.
See id. at 581 (discussing how states and cities have used administrative processes to
integrate immigrants into public life).
149 See id. at 609 (stating that true acceptance of the exclusivity principle would render
“restrictive ordinances, day labor centers, and sanctuary laws” vulnerable).
150 DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358 (1976).
151 See id. at 363, 365 (holding that state legislation that supplements federal statutes is an open
question and state courts should “decide the effect of these administrative regulations” to decide
whether they conflict with federal regulations).
152 See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 413-15 (2012) (preserving a state law that allowed
local law enforcement to assess someone’s immigration status).
153 See id. at 394 (“The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the
subject of immigration and the status of aliens.”).
154 New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 113 (2d Cir. 2020), reh’g denied 964 F.3d
150 (2d Cir. 2020).
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federal regulations.155 This concession appears at odds with the court’s earlier
claim that the anticommandeering rule is inapplicable in instances such as
immigration where states have no reserved power. By continuously
recognizing state power to regulate immigration, courts have transformed the
concept of “exclusivity” into mere boilerplate language.
Both sides—the federal government and sanctuary cities—premise the
entire sanctuary city debate on state and local involvement, further
undermining the federal government’s claim of exclusive federal authority.
The very facts that led to this dispute undermine the federal exclusivity
principle. In virtually every legal document in this case, from executive
orders156 to Byrne JAG grant applications157 to judicial opinions,158 the federal
government mandated state and local compliance. This begs the question:
How can an area truly be an exclusive federal power when it depends on state
and local government cooperation to function?
If the federal government truly had exclusive authority over immigration,
then it would not need to commandeer state and local officials. The purpose
of commandeering in the immigration context thus reveals the unique
incoherence of relying on the exclusivity fiction to authorize it.
CONCLUSION
At first glance, the Second Circuit’s opinion may come across as an
unremarkable circuit split regarding statutory authority. Its constitutional
analysis of § 1373, however, transformed its decision into a wholehearted
attack on the anticommandeering rule, subverting all notions of American
federalism. The immigration exception that the Second Circuit proposes
could have significant consequences. Under the Second Circuit’s logic that
preserved § 1373, the federal government could explicitly commandeer state
and local actors, legislatures, and even police forces to carry out federal
immigration-related regulations. Historically viewed as an essential check on
federal power, states could lose their ability to govern any area tangentially
related to immigration, including passing statutes within their own legislative
chambers or enforcing state law using local law enforcement.
155 See id. (surmising that there could be a scenario where states could pass immigration laws
so long as they do not conflict with federal law).
156 See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8800 (Jan. 25, 2017) (asking state and local
law enforcement agencies to perform the functions of immigration officers).
157 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFFICE OF JUST. PROGRAMS, STATE OR LOCAL
GOVERNMENT: FY 2017 CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2018) (requiring
state and local government officials to allow for information sharing regarding citizenship and
immigration status).
158 See New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d at 113 (finding that state or local limits on
information sharing were contrary to the policies “preferred by the federal government”).
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Moreover, the idea that exclusive enumerated powers should constitute an
exception to the anticommandeering rule will affect more than immigration.
The federal government could commandeer state agents, facilities, and
resources in a wide variety of areas, citing any enumerated power within the
Constitution, including its Commerce or Military Power. An enumerated
powers exception swallows the entirety of the anticommandeering rule.
Since the seminal anticommandeering cases, the Supreme Court has
blocked all attempts to instill a balancing test or carve out an enumerated
right exception to the anticommandeering rule. Even in recent years, the
Court has not only reaffirmed the justifications for the anticommandeering
rule but also broadened the definition of what federal laws constitute
anticommandeering. Each decision has only heightened the importance of
the anticommandeering rule in our federalist system.
From the very beginning of this nation, states have had plenary authority,
exerting a high degree of power over their own constituents. James Madison
wrote, “The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State
governments are numerous and indefinite.”159 By allowing the federal
government to seize state power based on a particular category of law, the
litigation surrounding the sanctuary city debate threatens to upend this reality.

159

THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison).
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